We reassess the respective gains from R&D cooperation and competition in a Cournot Duopoly with homogeneous goods, where firms adopt a concave cost-reducing R&D technology. Contrary to the previous literature on the same topic, our main results are that (i) no corner solutions emerge and (ii) cooperation, in the form of either a cartel or a joint venture, is always profitable for firms and (iii) socially superior to independent ventures, provided that spillovers are sufficiently high.
Introduction
The National Research Cooperation Act (1984) fosters R&D cooperation as a remedy to the well known effort duplication drawback affecting R&D races. 1 The existence of substantial spillovers in the R&D activity, as evidenced in Jaffe (1986) , has added momentum to the justification of a benevolent stance towards cooperation in research. Following Katz (1986) , a large body of literature has built the theoretical foundations and the policy legitimation to such measures. The most relevant contributions concerning the desirability of R&D cooperation are d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al. (1992) , Suzumura (1992) and Amir (2000) , to mention only a few. A thorough assessment can be found in Katz and Ordover (1990) .
d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) examine a Cournot duopoly, where each firm enjoys a spillover from the rival in terms of the final outcome of R&D activity, in the following sense. To firm i, investing k i costs bk 2 i (i.e., there are decreasing returns to R&D), but effective R&D, reducing firm i's marginal cost c i , is K i = k i + βk j , where β ∈ [0, 1] is the extent of the externality from the rival. Therefore, given a generic initial marginal cost c, we have c i = c − K i . In Kamien et al. (1992) , instead, the spillover effect is measured in value terms. They assume that each firm has a concave R&D technology f (Y i ) , where Y i = y i + βy j is the effective R&D effort, while firm i's marginal cost is c i = c−f (Y i ) . This is coupled with linear R&D costs equal Amir (2000) shows that the two models are isomorphic up to the transformation A further drawback appears since the model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin lacks an internal optimum over the whole admissible range of parameters.
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In this paper we address the same issue, i.e., the possible gains from R&D cooperation as compared to competition. We design a concave R&D technology with linear costs, such that (i) no corner solution emerges and
(ii) cooperation, in the form of either a cartel or a joint venture, is profitable for firms irrespective of the level of spillovers and also (iii) socially beneficial visà vis independent ventures, when technological spillovers are sufficiently large. This result shows up even though we keep unaltered the conditions on demand and production costs embraced in the aforementioned literature.
Moreover, it appears to be in line with empirical research assessing the size of technological spillovers (Jaffe, 1986 ).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The basic setup is 2 On this point, see Henriques (1990) 
The model
Consider a Cournot duopoly with homogeneous products where the demand function is
and firm i operates with the following cost function
where r is the rental price of capital and k i is the capital commitment devoted to process innovation. The linear cost associated with the R&D effort fits situations where firms must raise funds k i in order to finance research activities, at the cost measured by the relevant interest rate on long-run investments determined on capital markets. I.e., rk i is indeed the opportunity cost of committing resources k i to R&D instead of investing them otherwise.
If each firm activates an independent research division, the R&D technology is described by:
where β ∈ [0, 1] measures the reciprocal technological spillover received from the other firm. 3 This R&D technology is concave and bounded above and below. In particular,
If firms jointly activate a single R&D lab, production technology will be the same for both firms, i.e.: c i = c j = c. Undertaking an RJV involves i) the sharing of R&D costs, i.e.: k i = k/2; ii) β = 1. Therefore, R&D technology becomes:
Considered together, the cost function (2) and the R&D technology (3) or (5) replace the linear technology and the convex R&D cost function previously considered in d' Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) . It is also worth noting that the present setup cannot be transformed into theirs, as it was instead the case with the approach adopted by Kamien et al. (1992) . This is due to the fact that here (either in (3) or in (5)) c goes to zero only in the limit, as the industry R&D effort becomes infinitely large.
Regardless of the organization of the research activity, in the market stage firms always adopt a Cournot stance. Accordingly, individual equilibrium output is:
so that the profit function of firm i at the first stage of the game is:
endogenisation of spillovers is investigated in Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) and Amir and Wooders (2003) .
Noncooperative R&D
Here, we assume that firms behave noncooperatively in the first stage. The first order condition (FOC), for firm i, is:
which, imposing the symmetry condition k j = k i , becomes 4 :
The Nash equilibrium R&D effort is:
where
Non negativity and reality conditions require that:
We are then able to state the following:
Proposition 1 For all r ≥ r N we have a unique interior equilibrium for the R&D stage where
Proof. See Appendix.
By iterating the Hôspital rule we get:
Moreover, k N is always decreasing in r.
Using k N , one can obtain industry profits and social welfare at the Nash equilibrium. Consumer surplus is defined as:
Therefore, welfare is SW
R&D cartel
When firms build up a cartel in the R&D stage, they choose R&D efforts so as to maximize joint profits. Accordingly, their objective, in the first stage, becomes:
The distinctive feature of cartel behaviour consists in internalising the spillover effect. This can be seen by writing the FOC as follows:
The solution is 6 :
5 Throughout the paper, the expression of consumer surplus and social welfare are omitted for brevity. They are availble upon request. 6 As in the fully noncooperative case the FOC yields 3 solutions, out of which only one is acceptable.
It can be verified that r N ≥ r C for β ∈ [0, 1/2] and conversely in the remainder of the admissible interval of the spillover parameter.
Therefore:
Proposition 2 For all r ≥ r C we have a unique interior equilibrium for the R&D stage where
Proof. The proof is omitted as it replicates the same procedure seen in Proposition 1.
As in the fully noncooperative setting, the optimal R&D effort is everywhere decreasing in r, shrinking to zero in the limit when the cost of capital becomes infinitely high. Using the equilibrium controls we can get the optimal profits and social welfare as in the previous section.
RJV
Alternatively, firms may undertake joint R&D (RJV). As a result R&D is carried out in a single lab jointly funded by both firms symmetrically sharing the cost. Accordingly, the objective of the single firm is:
s.t. : c = c
Owing to the RJV, we impose (i) symmetry on marginal costs and R&D efforts across firms, and (ii), full spillovers, i.e., β = 1. Then the FOC is:
The only admissible solution is:
Reality and non negativity conditions require that r ≥ 16a
This is the most restrictive condition met so far.
Therefore:
Proposition 3 For all r ≥ r RJV we have a unique interior equilibrium for the R&D stage where k = k RJV .
Proof. The proof is omitted as it parallels that of Proposition 1.
As in the previous cases, the optimal R&D effort is everywhere decreasing in r, shrinking to zero in the limit when the cost of capital becomes infinitely high. Equilibrium values of sales and R&D investments can be used to obtain the optimal profits and social welfare. The above corollary is the main result drawn from the foregoing analysis.
It states that if technological externalities are large enough, then R&D co-operation is both profitable and socially efficient, in sharp contrast with the previous literature on the same topic.
Finally, taking into account the possibility of setting up RJVs, Propositions 4-5 also entail the following:
Corollary 2 RJV is profit -and welfare -superior as compared to both competitive and cartel R&D, irrespective of the level of spillovers.
Intuitively, the private and social desirability of a research joint venture visà vis any alternative organisational design of R&D activities stems from the saving effect implicit in activating a single research lab, whose costs are shared by firms. This enhances profits as well as social welfare.
Concluding remarks
We have revisited the issue of cooperative R&D investments in a Cournot duopoly where the R&D technology is characterised by spillovers and it is immune from corner solutions at the R&D stage of the game. In our fresh framework the conflict between private and social incentives towards R&D cooperation, highlighted in previous contributions, may disappear. 7 In particular, R&D cartelisation is privately and socially preferable to R&D competition if spillovers are large enough, which is the most common case, as empirical research on this issue confirms (see, e.g., Jaffe, 1986) . RJV remains the best alternative from both standpoints irrespective of the level of technological externalities. 
while global optimality requires the Hessian matrix to be semi-definite negative, i.e.: . This is the outcome of the functional form adopted to describe the R&D technology that belongs to the unit interval.
